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ABSTRACT 
 
Family members often accept lower than market returns for their contributions to the family 
business because the family business provides additional socioemotional wealth. The value of 
that socioemotional wealth as an annualized return is derived for a group of family farm 
managers by estimating the implied return from their contributions and comparing those 
estimates to market returns of farm managers. In the process an objective and financially 
sustainable compensation structure for small family businesses is developed.  Estimates of 
socioemotional wealth for farm managers range from an average of $22K to $33K per year on 
New York family farms over the period 1999-2008. 
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INTRODUCTION 
How and at what value owners, managers, and other employees are compensated is a sensitive 
subject for family businesses.  Thus, determining an appropriate compensation structure can be a 
difficult task while avoiding family conflict and maintaining long-term financial sustainability 
(Slaughter, 2010; Davis, 2007; Murak, 2001).  Typically within family businesses each family 
member possesses a unique set of skills that align with unequal contributions of equity, labor, 
and management.  These unequally distributed shares of equity, labor, and management between 
family members are often observed within generational family businesses as the elder 
generations maintain a greater share of equity and/or management relative to labor when 
compared to the younger generation(s) (Gersick et al., 1997).  The unequal share of equity, labor, 
and management across family members poses a challenge to objectively determine a fair and 
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financially sustainable compensation allocation that aligns with the family business strategy.  In 
addition, ample evidence from family businesses suggests that compensation may be comprised 
of both pecuniary and non-pecuniary returns (Stockmanns, Lybaert, and Voordeckers, 2010; 
Chrisman et al., 2010; Distelberg and Sorenson, 2009; Astrachan and Jaskiewicz, 2008; Gómez-
Mejía et al., 2007; Stafford et al., 1999).  The non-pecuniary components of the family business 
compensation have more recently been referred to as socioemotional wealth, or the affective 
endowment of family owners (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2011, Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007), and have 
been identified as a key driver of managerial decisions when considering organizational choices 
(Gómez-Mejía et al., 2011).  
Socioemotional wealth represents the tradeoffs family members make within an industry 
to work in the family business rather than an alternative business, and as a consequence family 
members often accept lower than market returns for their equity, labor, and management 
contributions within family businesses.  To date, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, no 
attempt has been made to quantify the returns associated with socioemotional wealth within 
family businesses.  Quantifying the returns of socioemotional wealth within family businesses 
will advance the understanding of the socioemotional wealth-financial performance relationship 
that has recently been identified as a research topic in the family business literature (Berrone et 
al., 2012).  Therefore, the objective of this paper is to determine an estimate of the implied 
returns associated with socioemotional wealth for managers within the family business.  Family 
businesses within the study are defined as family operated farm partnerships with more than one 
identified partner.  In order to determine an estimate of the implied returns to socioemotional 
wealth an objective and financially sustainable compensation structure for small family 
businesses is also developed.   
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The remainder of this article proceeds as follows.  The next section contains an overview 
of past research related to family business compensation.  The third section discusses the 
definitions of market value and implied compensation and relates the difference to an implied 
value of socioemotional wealth within small family businesses.  The fourth section discusses the 
empirical method we propose to arrive at an estimate of implied compensation net of any 
socioemotional wealth, and the fifth section describes the data.  The final two sections discuss 
the empirical results including an estimate of the farm manager implied value of socioemotional 
wealth, and finishes with concluding remarks. 
 
RESEARCH ON FAMILY BUSINESS COMPENSATION 
Deriving a method to equitably divide family partnership net income begins with an 
understanding of the small family business objective function.  Empirical evidence suggests that 
the small business financial objective function includes pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
components (Zellweger et al., 2011; Stockmanns, Lybaert, and Voordeckers, 2010; Chrisman et 
al., 2010; Distelberg and Sorenson, 2009; Zellweger and Astrachan, 2008; Astrachan and 
Jaskiewicz, 2008; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007; Stafford et al., 1999).  The non-pecuniary 
components of the small business financial objective function have more recently been referred 
to as socioemotional wealth (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2011, Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007).  Family firms 
defined by Chau et al. (1999) may pursue non-financial goals such as control (Ward, 1997), 
harmony and trust (Sharma and Manikutty, 2005), or even pride (Zellweger and Nason, 2008) 
among others.  Empirical evidence of the existence of non-economic returns associated with 
compensation have been observed where the mean risk adjusted return to business ownership is 
less than the mean risk adjusted return to investing in equities (Moskowitz and Vissing- 
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Jørgensen, 2002), and the median small business owner earns less than a wage worker 
(Hamilton, 2000).  These empirical observations suggest that family businesses associate 
positive value with socioemotional wealth because the tradeoffs of staying in the family business 
result in foregone opportunity of real economic return.  Some have argued that the small business 
objective function should include more than just returns, and should account for liquidity, 
diversification, control, accountability, flexibility, and transferability (LeCornu et al. 1996; 
McMahon and Stanger, 1995).  It is true that some small businesses pursue a lifestyle rather than 
a revenue growth structure, but on average in the long-run all businesses must be profitable for 
continued viability (Danes et al., 2009), else agency costs may lead to bankruptcy (Steijvers, 
Voordeckers, and Vanhoof, 2010; Steijvers and Voordeckers, 2009).  Therefore, any objective 
measure of family partner compensation used to determine an empirical compensation structure 
will be constrained by the necessary long-term profitability conditions.  A well-known 
framework that inherently accounts for long-term financial sustainability is profit maximization.  
McMahon and Stanger (1995), Ang (1992), and Kao (1985) have found evidence supporting the 
profit maximization for all or part of the small business financial objective function considering 
either short- or long-term expectations.   
Few studies exist to date that empirically investigate the compensation structure of family 
business net income, most likely due to a lack of available data.  Agency theory (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976) is one theoretical framework that has been chosen to address the compensation 
process within family business; however, much of this research has concerned executive level 
pay (Gómez-Mejía, Larraza, and Makri, 2003) or nonfamily pay (Block, 2011) within large 
family businesses.  Within the agricultural industry, Tauer (1997) used generalized linear models 
to assess an equitable division of farm partnership income and suggests compensation should be 
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determined with respect to the relative opportunity costs associated with each contribution of 
equity, labor, and management.  Others have used generalized linear models to assess the 
determinants of compensation between family and nonfamily managed firms (Carrasco-
Hernandez and Sánchez-Marin, 2007) and found employee compensation differs between firms.  
One study even displays a method to assess divisional profits within firms using a residual 
income measure when compared to return on investment (Frigo and Ciecka, 1995).  In the end, 
professional guidance is often suggested as to how one may determine a compensation structure 
within family businesses (Spector, 2001).  Most of the suggestions directed towards family 
businesses regarding compensation involve ways to avoid family conflict associated with 
compensation, and predominantly, it’s advised that market equivalent measures of compensation 
should be sought from own family research or industry consultants (Slaughter, 2010; Davis, 
2007; Spector, 2001).        
 This paper develops an empirical measure of family compensation that allows for an 
estimate of the implied returns associated with socioemotional wealth within family businesses. 
The results are useful for both academics and practitioners for a better understanding of the 
socioemotional wealth-financial performance relationship.  
 
METHODS 
An Empirical Measure of Family Business Compensation 
Determining an estimate of the implied returns associated with socioemotional wealth, or the 
tradeoffs family members make within an industry to work within the family business rather than 
an alternative business, requires an empirical estimate of family business compensation.  Once 
determined, the empirical compensation estimates may be compared to market compensation 
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estimates to arrive at an implied return for socioemotional wealth.  Recall that within this study 
family businesses are defined as family member partnerships with more than one identified 
partner.  Tax jurisdictions typically allow income allocation based upon sound business 
principles, and suggest reimbursing income relative to a fair market value.  In the U.S. the issue 
with compensation allocation for small family businesses is how to interpret what “fair market 
value compensation” or “reasonable compensation” represents when considering “performed 
services” (U.S. Dept. Treasury, 2010; Ricketts and Tunnell, 2006).  Some have suggested 
forming committees, boards, or even hiring consultants to solve the family business 
compensation dilemma (Spector, 2001).  Any estimate of owner, manager, or other employee 
compensation, whether it is internally or externally obtained, will be conditional on how “fair 
market value compensation” is defined.   
An objective strategy for determining compensation among family business partners 
might be to determine the implied economic value generated by equity, labor and management 
contributions.  An implied compensation estimate can be obtained empirically by determining 
the opportunity costs, or implied returns, associated with equity, labor and management.  In 
addition, implied compensation estimates are unbiased, and are empirically tractable from firm 
level data.  Opportunity costs are unbiased in the sense that they represent an implied economic 
return, unlike market compensation estimates.  The firm level data required to determine an 
implied estimate of compensation includes measures of income, firm size, and quantities of 
equity, labor, and management.      
For smaller sized family businesses, the previously discussed empirical evidence suggests 
that implied compensation estimates are expected to be observed below market compensation 
estimates due to the socioemotional wealth associated with family business compensation.  The 
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tradeoffs that family businesses make imply that family owners, managers, and other employees 
associate positive value with socioemotional wealth as often times lower financial returns ensue 
as a result of poorer performance relative to their larger market competitors.  Thus, an estimate 
of the implied economic value of the annual socioemotional wealth for family businesses may be 
represented by the magnitude of the difference between market and implied compensation 
estimates, as the difference between market and implied compensation estimates represent an 
estimate of the value of the tradeoffs that result in foregone opportunity of real economic return 
for family businesses.  Therefore, valuing the tradeoffs of foregone opportunity as the magnitude 
of the difference between market and implied compensation estimates represents an estimate of 
the implied return, which capitalized over time, produces socioemotional wealth.   
 
Comparing Market and Implied Compensation Estimates 
Before an implied return of socioemotional wealth can be determined the market and implied 
compensation estimates must be estimated.  Consideration must be taken when selecting a 
sample to obtain market compensation estimates to ensure an appropriate comparison is made to 
the implied compensation estimates.  An appropriate market compensation estimate can be 
obtained from compensation data that best reflects the opportunities a family members’, or in the 
case of this study, a managers’ skills would present in a competitive setting should they search 
for new employment outside the family business.  In other words, the market estimate should be 
determined from the representative industry and position a manager would most likely be 
employed within given their current skill set.1 
                                                 
1 Note that the market sample my contain observations from family and/or non-family 
businesses. 
 8 
 
Once the appropriate samples have been identified, market and implied compensation 
estimates may be obtained and their group means compared to test for statistical evidence of 
implied economic value associated with manager socioemotional wealth within family 
businesses.  Specifically, letting MTM represent the mean market manager compensation 
estimate, and FV represent the mean implied manager compensation estimate, the following 
hypothesis may be tested.      
Hypothesis I: 
0 :
:
MTM FV
a MTM FV
H
H
 
 

 .
 
Hypothesis I is a one-tailed test of the difference in group sample means between manager 
market and implied compensation estimates.  Rejecting the null hypothesis would provide 
statistical evidence that the magnitude of the difference between manager market and implied 
compensation estimates is statistically significant providing evidence that positive economic 
value is associated with socioemotional wealth for managers within family businesses.   In 
addition, the difference MTM FV  may be viewed as an approximation to the implied return 
associated with socioemotional wealth for managers within family businesses.   
 
Determining an Implied Compensation Estimate  
Profit maximization would be the natural choice to provide a framework to isolate economic 
returns from which implied compensation estimates may be determined.  Implied compensation 
estimates from a profit maximization framework inherently account for long-term financial 
sustainability as they are measures of the opportunity costs with respect to each contribution 
type, i.e. management, labor, or equity.  Within the context of compensation, opportunity costs 
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represent the implied compensation estimates that each contribution has earned relative to net 
income.  Therefore, implied compensation estimates may be obtained from a profit maximization 
framework by isolating net income that is allocated to equity, labor, and management.  How the 
implied compensation estimates are determined is described next.     
To begin we start with total revenue from the sale of output that is allocated to the input 
costs of the factors of production.  Taking total revenue minus total costs leaves profits that may 
be distributed to equity, labor, and management.  Depending on what expenses are included 
within total costs determines what profit represents.  Within this study, profits represent net 
income resulting from total revenue minus total costs that exclude unpaid labor.  Unpaid labor is 
excluded in order to achieve a net income measure from which implied compensation estimates 
for equity, labor, and management may be determined.  Therefore, each contribution of 
management, labor, and equity receives a share of net income according to the following 
relationship: 
(1)         
    
Net Income Management Return Quantity Management wage Quantity Labor
Rate of Return Quantity Equtiy
   
     
 To implement equation (1), econometric panel regression methods may be used to empirically 
estimate the opportunity costs associated with equity, labor, and management (i.e. the rate of 
return, wage, and management return in equation (1)).  Specifically, the estimated coefficients on 
the quantities of equity, labor, and management would be the implied rates of return that each of 
equity, labor, and management contributed to net income that lead to unbiased implied 
compensation estimates. This presumes that family members provide equity, labor, and 
management considering the socioemotional return as further payments.  
 The net income relationship in equation (1) may be estimated through fixed effects or 
random coefficient panel regression models.  Either method can evaluate dynamic relationships 
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between variables, control for unobserved heterogeneity, and incorporate relevant dependent and 
independent variables.  Using the coefficient estimates from the regressions with the sample data 
provides within sample predictions that are used to determine predicted implied compensation 
estimates for each quantity of equity, labor, and management.  The manager implied 
compensation estimates will then be compared to manager market compensation estimates to 
arrive at the implied value of manager socioemotional wealth. 
The general form fixed effects model (FEM) is: 
(2)    it it ity u   x β , i=1,…,N, t=1,…,T,  
where ity represents the firm i, year t dependent variable,   represents an intercept term, itx  
represents a row vector of independent variables for firm i, year t , β represents a column vector 
of coefficients, and  where it represents an error term 
for firm i, year t that is assumed to be distributed  20,N  .2  The other assumptive features of 
the FEM include (strict) exogeneity, non-autocorrelation, and achieving the full rank condition.  
In addition, either balanced or unbalanced panels may be used for estimation purposes as 
unbalanced panels pose no estimation difficulties (Wooldridge, 2002), 
 The random coefficient model (RCM) is more general than the FEM because parameter 
heterogeneity can be modeled as stochastic variation across subjects (Greene, 2003; Swamy, 
1970).  This allows the estimate of socioemotional return to differ among family businesses.  The 
RCM has been extended to accommodate panel data and can be described as: 
                                                 
2 Note equation (3) includes the intercept in parenthesis to indicate that the model may or may 
not include an estimate for the intercept. 
 if fixed cross-section effects
 if fixed time effects
 if both
i it
it t it
i t it
u
 
 
  
   
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(3)       it t it i i ity        x β , i=1,…,N, t=1,…,T,      
where ity represents the firm i, year t dependent variable,   represents an intercept term, t  
represents a time fixed effect, i  represents a random intercept term for firm i, itx  represents a 
row vector of independent variables for firm i, year t , i i β β v  represents a column vector of 
unit coefficients, and it represents an error term for firm i, year t which is assumed to be 
distributed  20,N  .  The addition of i  in equation (3) permits estimates of implied 
compensation, or indirectly, socioemotional wealth to differ among family businesses.  The 
RCM adjoins to equation (3) the assumption that the iβ are all related and typically has iβ
distributed as  ,N β Γ  where Γ is a matrix of variance and covariance terms to be estimated that 
represent the degree of heterogeneity of the unit coefficients implying v  is distributed  ,N 0 Γ .  
Thus, equation (3) can be rewritten as  
(4)       iit t it i it ity          x β x v , i=1,…,N, t=1,…,T, 
where the term in brackets represents a composite error term.  An important restrictive 
assumption of the RCM is that the stochastic process that generates iβ  is independent of the error 
process, and is also uncorrelated with the vector of independent variables itx ensuring the itx are 
uncorrelated with the complicated composite error term within brackets in equation (4).  The 
complication of the error term causes the conditions of the Gauss-Markov theorem to not hold, 
and therefore methods of Maximum Likelihood or other iterative methods must be used to obtain 
coefficient estimates.  The other assumed features of the RCM in equation (4) are the same as 
those for the FEM presented in equation (2) (Beck and Katz, 2007).      
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DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Panel Regression Data 
The data used for panel regression estimation are from the New York Dairy Farm Business 
Summary (DFBS) (Knoblauch et al., 2009) collected by Cornell University.  The sample consists 
of an unbalanced panel of 230 dairy farm businesses (1,165 observations) over the ten year 
period 1999-2008.  The 230 dairy farms included within the sample are considered full-time 
operations that primarily produce milk, and were identified as businesses having more than one 
identified partner.  Pooled summary statistics for the period covering 1999-2008 for each of the 
four variables are reported in Table 1. 
 Farms are a very suitable family business in which to estimate socioemotional wealth. 
Detailed financial data for 10 years on a large number of farms is not available for most other 
types of farm family businesses. Many farms have been in the family for numerous generations 
and there exists the strong goal of keeping the farm in the family for many more generations, 
generating a socioemotional value, but at the cost of possibly lower earned financial returns. This 
continuity, although nurtured in many other types of family businesses, is especially strong in 
agriculture given that the family members’ homes are typically located on the farm where 
children clearly bond and form an identity with the business.  In the case of the dairy farm often 
times the children are integrated within the family business at an early age through activities 
such as caring for the calves.  
"Insert Table 1 Here" 
Variables 
Four variables are included within the panel regressions that include measures of net income, 
equity, labor, and farm size.  Income and equity are presented in real terms by adjusting to base 
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year 2008 dollars using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) (U.S. Dept. of Labor 2010a).3  In 
addition, the real measures of income, equity, and the measure of labor are normalized by the 
yearly average number of cows to permit farm comparison on a per cow basis.   
Net income is defined as accrual net farm income without appreciation with unpaid 
family labor removed.  Over the ten year period 1999-2008 net farm income averaged $564 per 
cow in real terms base 2008.  Net farm income per cow was notoriously variable across each of 
the ten years, ranging from a low $179 per a cow in 2006 to a high of $1,188 per cow in 2007.   
In addition, net farm income per cow displayed a high degree of heterogeneity within each year, 
as for four out of ten years the standard deviation in net income was greater than the mean net 
income.      
Equity is based on the average difference between total farm assets market value and the 
average total farm liabilities book value from the beginning and ending balance sheets reported 
by each farm in the DFBS.  Average equity per cow was $6,038 in real terms for 1999-2008 and 
varied little year to year.  However, within year variation of equity signaled a high degree of 
heterogeneity between farms.  Operators’ labor months is defined as the summation of the full 
time months worked by each operator, including up to six operators.  On average, the farms 
within the DFBS recorded 30 full time months between 2.4 operators over 1999-2008.  Not 
surprisingly, operator labor months per cow trended downward over 1999-2008 as farms 
acquired and implemented technology to replace labor.  The natural logarithm of the average 
annual herd size was included as a control variable representing returns to management that 
                                                 
3    
 t t
Base CPIreal price current price
Current CPI
    
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account for the unobserved heterogeneity between farms attributed to differing levels of 
management quality and efficiency.4  
 
Market Compensation Data 
Market compensation estimates are required to test Hypothesis I.  For this particular study, 
management market and implied management compensation estimates covering 1999-2008 will 
be compared to test for evidence of positive implied economic value associated with 
socioemotional return.  The most appropriate representative market sample for farm managers 
would be from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Occupational Employment Statistics, New 
York farmers, ranchers, and other agricultural managers’ compensation data (U.S. Department of 
Labor, 2010b).  The BLS dataset best represents the management position a partner at a New 
York dairy farm would most likely be employed in farm management.  New York BLS data 
were selected to be consistent with the DFBS dataset.  Yearly medians and descriptive statistics 
for the BLS dataset for 1999-2008 are reported in Table 3.  
Unfortunately, there is currently no publically traded equity in farm businesses to 
compare to the implied compensation estimates for equity within dairy farms. The indices that 
are currently available track the agricultural oriented firms that either provide inputs to farmers 
or process agricultural products.  The businesses currently within agricultural indices are also 
much larger than the typical farm, and are not considered a representative comparison to dairy 
farm family businesses.  Once a comparable index exists, future studies may asses the market vs. 
implied compensation estimates of equity returns using this analysis. 
 
                                                 
4 The natural log of average herd size was included as a control variable because larger dairy 
herds traditionally incur larger returns, and return growth displays diminishing marginal returns. 
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
One fixed effects, and two random coefficient panel regression models were estimated to 
determine the implied returns associated with equity, labor, and management within farm family 
businesses.  Since preliminary data analysis suggested a high degree of sample heterogeneity 
between cross-sections and across time, a two-way fixed effects, a one parameter random 
coefficient, and two parameter random coefficient panel regressions were selected.  These three 
methods are flexible when considering controlling for unobserved heterogeneity but their results 
should be similar.  Predicted values from the three models representing manager implied 
compensation estimates are based on the sample medians of the DFBS data for1999-2008.   
 
Fixed Effects Model 
The two-way fixed effects model over time and farms is estimated as:  
(7)    0 3 1 2it i t it it it itnfipcow logcow equitypcow oplaborcow             .  Within 
equation (7) the coefficient 1  represents the implied rate of return earned by equity per cow, and 
2  represents the implied return per month of operators’ labor per cow.   The parameters within 
the parenthesis in equation (7) represent the implied returns to management.  The intercept term
0 can be considered a common portion of the residual return to management.  The fixed firm 
effects i are included to control for unobserved heterogeneity attributed to differences between 
management skills, and the fixed time effects t are considered to be exogenous bonuses to 
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management in a given year.5  The final portion of management compensation is returns relative 
to farm size represented by 3 .    
The two-way fixed effects panel regression results are reported in Table 2.  The F-
statistic for testing the hypothesis of no fixed effects is highly significant indicating fixed effects 
should be included within the model, and an adjusted-R2 of 0.62 suggests a reasonable fit to the 
data.  Eight of the nine year fixed effects are significant at the α=0.05 level indicating that net 
income varies annually.  The firm fixed effects estimates (not reported) range from -417 to 1,771 
with 134 significant at the α=0.05 level indicating a high degree of heterogeneity between farms 
as expected.  Coefficient estimates on equity, labor, and management indicate that in the long-
run equity earns an implied real annual return of approximately 6 percent per year, operator labor 
earns an implied real return of $259 per labor month per cow, and management earns the implied 
real return from the sum of $2,685 346*i t itlogcow     for a given firm in a given year. 
A 6 percent annual real return on equity per year may seem low; however, equity owners 
also accrue any capital appreciation, which over the ten year period 1999-2008 averaged 
approximately 10 percent per year in real terms for a total average annual return to equity of 
approximately 16 percent for the farms within this study.6  Given the two-way fixed effects 
regression results, on the average 413-cow farm from the data set over 1999-2008, operator 12 
month implied compensation estimate would be $42,787.7  The average management implied 
                                                 
5 Any bonuses associated with a given sample year are allocated to management since 
management assumes responsibility for risk taking behavior. 
6 Capital appreciation is determined from balance sheet estimates provided by each family 
business. 
7 $259*413 cows = $106,967/2.5 years = $42,787.  The 2.5 years is the average operator labor 
months per farm over 1999-2008. 
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compensation estimate for a 413-cow farm would be $330 per year.8  With an average of 2.4 
operators per farm, the average management implied compensation estimate would be $138 per 
operator per year.  At first glance the management implied compensation estimate seems low but 
on most New York dairy farms it is very likely that the management and operator roles are 
coupled.  Therefore, for this paper it is assumed that manager implied compensation estimates 
are defined as the sum of the predicted implied returns to management and operators labor 
resulting from panel regression estimation.  
 
Random Coefficient Models 
Two random coefficient panel regression models were estimated to allow for a more flexible 
control of the unobserved heterogeneity between farms:  one model controls for farm and 
management unobserved heterogeneity, the other model controls for only farm unobserved 
heterogeneity.  The random coefficient model that controls for farm and management 
unobserved heterogeneity is estimated as:  
(8)  
 
 
3 1 2
3
it t it it it
i it it
nfipcow logcow equitypcow oplaborcow
v logcow
    
 
    
   .
 
Interpretation of the coefficients in equation (8) are the same as equation (7), the only difference 
being that 3i it itv logcow   represents a composite complicated error term that includes 
random coefficients for firm effects and herd size.  Therefore, management implied returns are 
augmented to incorporate the random farm and herd size coefficients and are defined as
   3 3i t itv logcow       .  The stochastic farm and herd size effects, i and 3v , within 
                                                 
8 (-$2,685+$782+$149) + $346×log(413 cows) = $330.  The $782 and $149 are the average 
yearly firm and time fixed effects values. 
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equation (8) are appended to management implied returns to better control for the unobserved 
heterogeneity across management quality and efficiency.  Random farm effects capture 
differences in management styles, and random herd size effects capture differences in 
management efficiency as some managers are better at maintaining small herds rather than large 
herds.  For comparison purposes, a random coefficient model was estimated with only random 
farm effects included to control for management quality and efficiency together.  The difference 
between the two coefficient and one coefficient RCM is that the stochastic herd size effects, 3v , 
would be dropped from the implied returns to management leaving   3i t itlogcow      .9            
 Results for both RCMs can be found in Table 2.  A likelihood ratio test performed on the 
-2 residual/restricted log likelihoods for both random coefficient models and was significant at 
the 0.01   level indicating the addition of a random herd size effect in a model with random 
farm effects is a significant improvement. 10   The random coefficient model including random 
farm and herd size components indicates that in the long-run equity earns an implied real return 
of approximately 5 percent per year, operator labor earns an implied real return of $323 per labor 
month per cow, and management earns an implied real return represented by 
 $778 $167 *i t i itv logcow       for a given farm in a given year.  The farm random effects 
range from -3,143 to 1,700 with 124 significant at the 0.05   level, while the herd size random 
effects range from -307 to 475 with 77 significant at the 0.05   level confirming the high 
degree of heterogeneity between farms.   
                                                 
9 A random coefficients model that only includes a random component related to the constant 
term is also considered a random effects model.   
10 The likelihood ratio test when compared to the null model is evaluated as a chi-squared test 
with 3 degrees, and 2 degrees of freedom for the random intercept model. 
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 The random coefficient model including only random farm effects indicates that in the 
long-run equity earns an implied real return of approximately 5 percent per year, operator labor 
earns an implied real return of $231 per labor month per cow, and management earns an implied 
real return represented by $690 $153*i t itlogcow      for a given farm in a given year.  The 
farm random effects range from -1,044 to 615 with 55 significant at the 0.05   level.   
"Insert Table 2 Here" 
Testing Hypothesis I 
We are interested in testing for evidence of positive implied return associated with 
socioemotional wealth for family business partners over the period of 1999-2008 as formulated 
in hypothesis I. This hypothesis may be tested by using a one-sided independent two-sample t-
test for comparison of group means (Kutner et al., 2005).  In order for the two-sample t-statistic 
to be a valid test statistic the assumptions that the data originate from a normally distributed 
independent random sample must be confirmed.   
Independence between samples is trivial as the Bureau of Labor Statistics datasets 
excludes self-employed workers. Normality of each univariate sample is statistically tested 
through the Shapiro-Wilk statistic (Shapiro and Wilk, 1965) using approximation methods from 
Royston (1992).  Lastly, since the two-sample t-statistic assumes equal variance for both 
samples, a folded F-statistic based on Steel and Torrie (1980) may be determined to assess the 
hypothesis that the sample variances are equal.           
The median farm manager market and implied compensation estimates from 1999-2001 
are reported in Table 3.  The median manager market and implied compensation estimates are 
compared because the cross-sectional predictions (not shown) are right skewed due to the larger 
farms within the sample.  The Shapiro-Wilk W statistics (not shown) were highly significant for 
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all four samples confirming univariate sample normality.  The folded F-tests (not shown) testing 
the null hypothesis of equal sample variances for each of the market to implied sample pairs 
were not significant, failing to reject the null hypothesis that the sample means are equal, 
finalizing the complete validation of the assumptions required for the two-sample t-statistic 
(Kutner et al., 2005). 
"Insert Table 3 Here" 
The t-values and power of the one-sided two-sample independent t-tests comparing group 
means for the manager median market and implied compensation estimates over 1999-2008 are 
reported in Table 4.  The two-sample t-statistics testing each of the three mean manager implied 
compensation estimates compared to the mean manager market compensation estimates are all 
significant at the α=0.01level rejecting the null in hypothesis I that manager group mean market 
and implied compensation estimates for 1999-2008 are equal.  Rejection of hypothesis I provides 
statistical evidence that positive implied economic value was associated with socioemotional 
wealth for managers within dairy farm family businesses over the period 1999-2008.  Power 
calculations in Table 4 indicate all three tests have a high degree of sensitivity reflecting a low 
probability of a Type II error.  Differences in the manager market and implied compensation 
estimates indicate that family business managers’ socioemotional wealth had an implied 
economic value ranging from $22K to $33K per year over 1999-2008. 
"Insert Table 4 Here" 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
An empirical estimate of the implied return associated with socioemotional wealth was estimated 
for managers within New York dairy farm family businesses.  Also, an empirical technique was 
developed to compare market compensation returns for managers to the estimated implied 
 21 
 
manager compensation returns in the family business to test for the extent of positive implied 
return associated with manager socioemotional wealth.  New York dairy farm partnership 
financial data from an unbalanced panel were used within fixed effects and random coefficient 
panel regression models to estimate the implied returns to equity, labor, and management while 
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity arising from differing firm size and management. Farm 
data are ideal for empirical testing for socioemotional wealth given the long standing goal of 
farm families to keep the farm in the business and the availability of an extended and large panel 
data set from the same business type, which in this case are family dairy farms. 
Results of one-sided two-sample t-tests provide statistical evidence that managers within 
dairy farm family businesses append economic value to socioemotional wealth since the implicit 
financial return that that they earn from the family business is statistically lower than the market 
return of farm managers. The socioemotional return was estimated to range from 22 to 33 
thousand dollars a year per family partner with financial returns that averaged 27 to 37 thousand 
dollars per year per manager, for a total compensation of 49 to 70 thousand dollars a year 
comprising a total return consisting of financial returns and socioemotional wealth.  Panel 
regression estimates suggest equity earns an implied return of 4.5 to 6 percent excluding capital 
appreciation.  
 Although the results of this analysis are based on a sample of New York dairy farms the 
generality of the methods is applicable to all closely held private small family businesses.  Future 
research could apply the methods developed within this paper to other industries to further assess 
the socioemotional wealth-financial performance tradeoff between family and nonfamily 
businesses.  Experimental methods may also be utilized to elicit the beliefs of family businesses 
on the value of socioemotional wealth.  Our data set includes very limited characteristics of these 
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family businesses, but characteristics may also be collected to help determine the driving factors 
behind the implied valuations of socioemotional wealth.  Lastly, once a comparable agricultural 
equity index is developed the socioemotional wealth-financial performance relationship may be 
assessed for the equity contribution within dairy farm family businesses.  
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Table 1.  Pooled Variable Summary Statistics and Definitions for New York Dairy Farms 
1999-2008 (N = 1,165) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Definition 
nfipcow $564 $549 Net farm income per cow in 2008 dollars 
equitypcow  $6,038 $3,016  Equity per cow in 2008 dollars 
oplaborcow 0.159 0.138 Operator labor months per cow 
logcow 5.582 0.971 log(average yearly total cows) 
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Table 2.  Parameter Estimates for the Fixed-Effects and Random Coefficient Regression 
Models for New York Dairy Farms, 1999-2008.  (N=1,165) 
 Two-way Fixed Effects 
Model 
Random Intercept and 
logcow Model 
Random Intercept 
Model  
Variable Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value 
Intercept -2,684.7600*** 
(619.200) 
-4.34 
 
-778.4700*** 
(273.030) 
-2.85 
 
-690.1400*** 
(262.980) 
-2.62 
 
equitypcow  0.0611*** 
(0.013) 
4.56 
 
0.0488*** 
(0.007) 
6.93 
 
0.04523*** 
(0.007) 
6.52 
  
oplaborcow 259.1820 
(361.900) 
0.72 
 
322.7400 
(261.790) 
1.23 
 
230.9400 
(244.780) 
0.94 
 
logcow 345.5163*** 
(96.612) 
3.58 
 
166.5900*** 
(40.984) 
4.06 
 
153.2000*** 
(38.965) 
3.93 
 
Year 1999 460.7794*** 
(65.416) 
7.04 
 
313.6300*** 
(49.552) 
6.33 
 
330.1100*** 
(49.557) 
6.66 
 
Year 2000 76.9189 
(63.813) 
1.21 
 
-57.3386 
(48.786) 
-1.18 
 
-41.8213 
(48.773) 
-0.86 
 
Year 2001 345.6560*** 
(60.505) 
5.71 
 
234.3600*** 
(49.182) 
5.03 
 
247.9300*** 
(49.331) 
5.03 
 
Year 2002 -136.8280** 
(58.266) 
-2.35 
 
-237.5000*** 
(49.119) 
-4.84 
 
-226.4900*** 
(49.284) 
-4.6 
 
Year 2003 -178.8780*** 
(57.310) 
-3.12 
 
-261.9400*** 
(49.494) 
-5.29 
 
-256.5500*** 
(49.682) 
-5.16 
 
Year 2004 322.5802*** 
(53.982) 
5.98 
 
257.9400*** 
(48.079) 
5.36 
 
262.1800*** 
(48.299) 
5.43 
 
Year 2005 137.3242*** 
(49.340) 
2.78 
 
99.1028** 
(45.822) 
2.16 
 
105.7100** 
(46.076) 
2.29 
 
Year 2006 -332.0110*** 
(47.969) 
-6.92 
 
-351.7500*** 
(45.396) 
-7.75 
 
-349.0200*** 
(47.969) 
-7.64 
 
Year 2007 649.0500*** 
(43.497) 
14.92 
 
643.2700*** 
(42.827) 
15.02 
 
642.6400*** 
(43.128) 
14.9 
 
F-stat. no 
fixed effects 
8.18*** 
  -  - 
 
R2 0.70  -  -  
Adjusted R2 0.62  -  -  
-2 Res. Log 
Likelihood -  17,101  17,121 
 
a Note that *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels. 
b Standard errors (rounded) are in parenthesis.  
 
 30 
 
Table 3.   Median Farm Manager Market and Implied Compensation Estimates and 
Summary Statistics for New York Dairy Farms, 1999-2008. 
  Predicted Implied Manager Compensation 
Estimates 
Year/Statistic Market Estimate Two-way FE
 Random Int. 
and logcow Random Int.
 
1999 $41,884 $22,386 $27,964 $20,039 
2000 $46,191 $24,338 $30,263 $21,709 
2001 $53,013 $26,707 $33,297 $23,881 
2002 $53,929 $26,675 $33,514 $23,905 
2003 $61,440 $28,723 $35,783 $25,597 
2004 $64,466 $31,065 $38,693 $27,752 
2005 $74,986 $30,562 $38,135 $27,306 
2006 $72,129 $32,155 $39,984 $28,654 
2007 $68,899 $32,535 $40,474 $29,064 
2008 $53,726 $41,971 $52,296 $37,443 
Mean $59,066 $29,712 $37,040 $26,535 
St. Dev. $11,096 $5,463 $6,778 $4,857 
a All Dollar values are measured in real terms base year 2008. 
b Market compensation estimates are based on U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics  
Occupational Employment Statistics, New York farmers, ranchers, and other agricultural 
managers dataset (U.S. Department of Labor, 2010b).  
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Table 4.  Two-Sample t-tests Comparing Sample Means of Farm Manager Market and 
Implied Compensation Estimates for New York Dairy Farms, 1999-2008 (N1=N2=10). 
Two-way FE  Random Int. and logcow Random Int.  
t-value Power t-value Power t-value Power 
7.51*** 0.9999 5.36*** 0.9493 8.49*** 1.0000 
a Note that *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels. 
b Power calculations are based on the α=0.0001 level. 
c Market compensation estimates are based on U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Occupational 
Employment Statistics, New York farmers, ranchers, and other agricultural managers data (U.S. 
Department of Labor, 2010b).  
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